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Abstract 
In recent years, China's power and influence relative to those of other great states have outgrown the 
expectations of even its own leaders. A unique feature of Chinese leaders' understanding of their country's 
history is their persistent sensitivity to domestic disorder caused by foreign threats. From ancient times, the 
ruling regime of the day has often been brought down by a combination of internal uprising and external 
invasion. But even as economic interests became a major driver of China's behavior on the international 
scene, traditional security concerns and the need to guard against Western political interference remained 
important. The need to identify an organizing principle to guide Chinese foreign policy is widely recognized 
today in China's policy circles and scholarly community, as well as among international analysts. The first 
transformation is the Chinese government's adoption of a comprehensive understanding of security, which 
incorporates economic and non traditional concerns with traditional military and political interests. 
 
 
Any country's grand strategy must answer at least three questions: What are the nation's core 
interests? What external forces threaten them? And what can the national leadership do to safeguard 
them? Whether China has any such strategy today is open to debate. On the one hand, over the last 
three decades or so, its foreign and defense policies have been remarkably consistent and reasonably 
well coordinated with the country's domestic priorities. On the other hand, the Chinese government has 
yet to disclose any document that comprehensively expounds the country's strategic goals and the 
ways to achieve them. For both policy analysts in China and China watchers abroad, China's grand 
strategy is a field still to be plowed. 
In recent years, China's power and influence relative to those of other great states have outgrown the 
expectations of even its own leaders. Based on the country's enhanced position, China's international 
behavior has become increasingly assertive, as was shown by its strong reactions to a chain of events 
in 2010: for example, Washington's decision to sell arms to Taiwan, U.S.-South Korean military 
exercises in the Yellow Sea, and Japan's detention of a Chinese sailor found in disputed waters. It has 
become imperative for the international community to understand China's strategic thinking and try to 
forecast how it might evolve according to China's interests and its leaders' vision. 
 
 
THE ENEMY WITHIN AND WITHOUT 
A unique feature of Chinese leaders' understanding of their country's history is their persistent 
sensitivity to domestic disorder caused by foreign threats. From ancient times, the ruling regime of the 
day has often been brought down by a combination of internal uprising and external invasion. The Ming 
dynasty collapsed in 1644 after rebelling peasants took the capital city of Beijing and the Manchu, with 
the collusion of Ming generals, invaded from the north. Some three centuries later, the Manchu's own 
Qing dynasty collapsed after a series of internal revolts coincided with invasions by Western and 
Japanese forces. The end of the Kuomintang's rule and the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 
was caused by an indigenous revolution inspired and then bolstered by the Soviet Union and the 
international communist movement. 
Since then, apprehensions about internal turbulences have lingered. Under Mao Zedong's leadership, 
from 1949 to 1976, the Chinese government never formally applied the concept of "national interest" to 
delineate its strategic aims, but its international strategies were clearly dominated by political and 
military security interests-themselves often framed by ideological principles such as "proletarian 
internationalism." Strategic thinking at the time followed the Leninist tradition of dividing the world into 
political camps: archenemies, secondary enemies, potential allies, revolutionary forces. Mao's "three 
worlds theory" pointed to the Soviet Union and the United States as China's main external threats, with 
corresponding internal threats coming from pro-Soviet "revisionists" and pro-American "class enemies." 
China's political life in those years was characterized by recurrent struggles against international and 
domestic schemes to topple the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership or change its political 
coloring. Still, since Mao's foreign policy supposedly represented the interests of the "international 
proletariat" rather than China's own, and since China was economically and socially isolated from much 
of the world, Beijing had no comprehensive grand strategy to speak of. 
Then came the 1980s and Deng Xiaoping. As China embarked on reform and opened up, the ccp made 
economic development its top priority. Deng's foreign policy thinking departed appreciably from that of 
Mao. A major war with either the Soviet Union or the United States was no longer deemed inevitable. 
China made great efforts to develop friendly and cooperative relations with countries all over the world, 
regardless of their political or ideological orientation; it reasoned that a non confrontational posture 
would attract foreign investment to China and boost trade. A peaceful international environment, an 
enhanced position for China in the global arena, and China's steady integration into the existing 
economic order would also help consolidate the CCP's power at home. 
But even as economic interests became a major driver of China's behavior on the international scene, 
traditional security concerns and the need to guard against Western political interference remained 
important. Most saliently, the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 and, in its wake, the West's sanctions 
against Beijing served as an alarming reminder to China's leaders that internal and external troubles 
could easily intertwine. Over the next decade, Beijing responded to Western censure by contending that 
the state's sovereign rights trumped human rights. It resolutely refused to consider adopting Western-
type democratic institutions. And it insisted that it would never give up the option of using force if 
Taiwan tried to secede. 
Despite those concerns, however, by the beginning of the twenty first century, China's strategic thinkers 
were depicting a generally favorable international situation. In his 2002 report to the CCP National 
Congress, General Secretary Jiang Zemin foresaw a "20 years' period of strategic opportunity, "during 
which China could continue to concentrate on domestic tasks. Unrest has erupted at times-such as the 
violent riots in Tibet in March 2008 and in Xinjiang in July 2009, which the central government blamed 
on "foreign hostile forces" and responded to with harsh reprisals. And Beijing claims that the awarding 
of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a political activist it deems to be a "criminal trying to 
sabotage the socialist system," has proved once again Westerners' "ill intentions." Still, the Chinese 
government has been perturbed by such episodes only occasionally, which has allowed it to focus on 
redressing domestic imbalances and the unsustainability of its development. 
Under President Hu Jintao, Beijing has in recent years formulated a new development and social policy 
geared toward continuing to promote fast economic growth while emphasizing good governance, 
improving the social safety net, protecting the environment, encouraging independent innovation, 
lessening social tensions, perfecting the financial system, and stimulating domestic consumption. As 
Chinese exports have suffered from the global economic crisis since 2008, the need for such economic 
and social transformations has become more urgent. 
With that in mind, the Chinese leadership has redefined the purpose of China's foreign policy. As Hu 
announced in July 2009, China's diplomacy must "safeguard the interests of sovereignty, security, and 
development." Dai Bingguo, the state councilor for external relations, further defined those core 
interests in an article last December: first, China's political stability, namely, the stability of the ccp 
leadership and of the socialist system; second, sovereign security, territorial integrity, and national 
unification; and third, China's sustainable economic and social development. 
Apart from the issue of Taiwan, which Beijing considers to be an integral part of China's territory, the 
Chinese government has never officially identified any single foreign policy issue as one of the country's 
core interests. Last year, some Chinese commentators reportedly referred to the South China Sea and 
North Korea as such, but these reckless statements, made with no official authorization, created a great 
deal of confusion. In fact, for the central government, sovereignty, security, and development all 
continue to be China's main goals. As long as no grave danger-for example, Taiwan's formal 
secession-threatens the CCP leadership or China's unity, Beijing will remain preoccupied with the 
country's economic and social development, including in its foreign policy. 
 
 
THE PRINCIPLE'S PRINCIPLE 
The need to identify an organizing principle to guide Chinese foreign policy is widely recognized today 
in China's policy circles and scholarly community, as well as among international analysts. However, 
defining China's core interests according to the three prongs of sovereignty, security, and development, 
which sometimes are in tension, means that it is almost impossible to devise a straightforward 
organizing principle. And the variety of views among Chinese political elites complicates efforts to 
devise any such grand strategy based on political consensus. 
One popular proposal has been to focus on the United States as a major threat to China. Proponents of 
this view cite the ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius, who said, "A state without an enemy or external 
peril is absolutely doomed."Or they reverse the political scientist Samuel Huntington's argument that 
"the ideal enemy for America would be ideologically hostile, racially and culturally different, and militarily 
strong enough to pose a credible threat to American security" and cast the United States as an ideal 
enemy for China. This notion is based on the long-held conviction that the United States, along with 
other Western powers and Japan, is hostile to China's political values and wants to contain its rise by 
supporting Taiwan's separation from the mainland. Its proponents also point to U.S. politicians' 
sympathy for the Dalai Lama and Uighur separatists, continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. military 
alliances and arrangements supposedly designed to encircle the Chinese mainland, the currency and 
trade wars waged by U.S. businesses and the U.S. Congress, and the West's argument that China 
should slow down its economic growth in order to help stem climate change. 
This view is reflected in many newspapers and on many Web sites in China (particularly those about 
military affairs and political security). Its proponents argue that China's current approach to foreign 
relations is far too soft; Mao's tit-for-tat manner is touted as a better model. As a corollary, it is said that 
China should try to find strategic allies among countries that seem defiant toward the West, such as 
Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Some also recommend that Beijing use its holdings of U.S. Treasury 
bonds as a policy instrument, standing ready to sell them if U.S. government actions undermine China's 
interests. 
This proposal is essentially misguided, for even though the United States does pose some strategic and 
security challenges to China, it would be impractical and risky to construct a grand strategy based on 
the view that the United States is China's main adversary.Few countries, if any, would want to join 
China in an anti-U.S. alliance. And it would seriously hold back China's economic development to 
antagonize the country's largest trading partner and the world's strongest economic and military power. 
Fortunately, the Chinese leadership is not about to carry out such a strategy. Premier Wen Jiabao was 
not just being diplomatic last year when he said of China and the United States that "our common 
interests far outweigh our differences." 
Well aware of this, an alternative school of thought favors Deng's teaching of tao guang yang hui, or 
keeping a low profile in international affairs. Members of this group, including prominent political figures, 
such as Tang Jiaxuan, former foreign minister, and General Xiong Guangkai, former deputy chief of 
staff of the People's Liberation Army, argue that since China remains a developing country, it should 
concentrate on economic development. Without necessarily rebuffing the notion that the West, 
particularly the United States, is a long-term threat to China, they contend that China is not capable of 
challenging Western primacy for the time being-and some even caution against hastily concluding that 
the West is in decline. Meanwhile, they argue, keeping a low profile in the coming decades will allow 
China to concentrate on domestic priorities. 
Although this view appears to be better received internationally than the other, it, too, elicits some 
concerns. Its adherents have had to take great pains to explain that tao guang yang hui, which is 
sometimes mistranslated as "hiding one's capabilities and biding one's time," is not a calculated call for 
temporary moderation until China has enough material power and confidence to promote its hidden 
agenda. Domestically, the low-profile approach is vulnerable to the charge that it is too soft, especially 
when security issues become acute. As nationalist feelings surge in China, some Chinese are pressing 
for a more can-do foreign policy. Opponents also contend that this notion, which Deng put forward more 
than 20 years ago, may no longer be appropriate now that China is far more powerful. 
Some thoughtful strategists appreciate that even if keeping a low profile could serve China's political 
and security relations with the United States well, it might not apply to China's relations with many other 
countries or to economic issues and those non traditional security issues that have become essential in 
recent years, such as climate change, public health, and energy security. (Beijing can hardly keep a low 
profile when it actively participates in mechanisms such as BRIC, the informal group formed by Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and the new member South Africa.) A foreign policy that insists merely on keeping 
China's profile low cannot cope effectively with the multifaceted challenges facing the country today. 
HOME IS WHERE THE HEART IS 
A more sophisticated grand strategy is needed to serve China's domestic priorities. The government 
has issued no official written statement outlining such a vision, but some direction can be gleaned from 
the concepts of a "scientific outlook on development" and "building a harmonious society," which have 
been enunciated by Hu and have been recorded in all important CCP documents since 2003. In 2006, 
the Central Committee of the CCP announced that China's foreign policy "must maintain economic 
construction as its centerpiece, be closely integrated into domestic work, and be advanced by 
coordinating domestic and international situations." Moreover, four ongoing changes in China's 
strategic thinking may suggest the foundations for a new grand strategy. 
The first transformation is the Chinese government's adoption of a comprehensive understanding of 
security, which incorporates economic and non traditional concerns with traditional military and political 
interests. Chinese military planners have begun to take into consideration transnational problems such 
as terrorism and piracy, as well as cooperative activities such as participation in un peacekeeping 
operations. Similarly, it is now clear that China must join other countries in stabilizing the global 
financial market in order to protect its own economic security. All this means that it is virtually 
impossible to distinguish China's friends from its foes. The United States might pose political and 
military threats, and Japan, a staunch U.S. ally, could be a geopolitical competitor of China's, but these 
two countries also happen to be two of China's greatest economic partners. Even though political 
difficulties appear to be on the rise with the European Union, it remains China's top economic partner. 
Russia, which some Chinese see as a potential security ally, is far less important economically and 
socially to China than is South Korea, another U.S. military ally. It will take painstaking efforts on 
Beijing's part to limit tensions between China's traditional political-military perspectives and its 
broadening socioeconomic interests-efforts that effectively amount to reconciling the diverging legacies 
of Mao and Deng. The best Beijing can do is to strengthen its economic ties with great powers while 
minimizing the likelihood of a military and political confrontation with them. 
A second transformation is unfolding in Chinese diplomacy: it is becoming less country-oriented and 
more multilateral and issue-oriented. This shift toward functional focuses-counterterrorism, nuclear non 
proliferation, environmental protection, energy security, food safety, post-disaster reconstruction has 
complicated China's bilateral relationships, regardless of how friendly other states are toward it. For 
example, diverging geostrategic interests and territorial disputes have long come between China and 
India, but the two countries' common interest in fending off the West's pressure to reduce carbon 
emissions has drawn them closer. And now that Iran has become a key supplier of oil to China, its 
problems with the West over its nuclear program are testing China's stated commitment to the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. 
Changes in the mode of China's economic development account for a third transformation in the 
country's strategic thinking. Beijing's preoccupation with GDP growth is slowly giving way to concerns 
about economic efficiency, product quality, environmental protection, the creation of a social safety net, 
and technological innovation. Beijing's understanding of the core interest of development is expanding 
to include social dimensions. Correspondingly, China's leaders have decided to try to sustain the 
country's high growth rate by propping up domestic consumption and reducing over the long term the 
country's dependence on exports and foreign investment. They are now more concerned with global 
economic imbalances and financial fluctuations, even as international economic frictions are becoming 
more intense because of the global financial crisis. China's long-term interests will require some 
incremental appreciation of the yuan, but its desire to increase its exports in the short term will prevent 
its decision-makers from taking the quick measures urged by the United States and many other 
countries. Only the enhancement of China's domestic consumption and a steady opening of its capital 
markets will help it shake off these international pressures. 
The fourth transformation has to do with China's values. So far, China's officials have said that although 
China has a distinctive political system and ideology, it can cooperate with other countries based on 
shared interests-although not, the suggestion seems to be, on shared values. But now that they 
strongly wish to enhance what they call the "cultural soft power of the nation" and improve China's 
international image, it appears necessary to also seek common values in the global arena, such as 
good governance and transparency. Continuing trials and tribulations at home, such as pervasive 
corruption and ethnic and social unrest in some regions, could also reinforce a shift in values among 
China's political elite by demonstrating that their hold on power and the country's continued resurgence 
depend on greater transparency and accountability, as well as on a firmer commitment to the rule of 
law, democracy, and human rights, all values that are widely shared throughout the world today. 
All four of these developments are unfolding haltingly and are by no means irreversible. Nonetheless, 
they do reveal fundamental trends that will likely shape China's grand strategy in the foreseeable future. 
When Hu and other leaders call for "coordinating domestic and international situations," they mean that 
efforts to meet international challenges must not undermine domestic reforms. And with external 
challenges now coming not only from foreign powers-especially the United States and Japan-but also, 
and increasingly, from functional issues, coping with them effectively will require engaging foreign 
countries cooperatively and emphasizing compatible values. 
Thus, it would be imprudent of Beijing to identify any one country as a major threat and invoke the need 
to keep it at bay as an organizing principle of Chinese foreign policy-unless the United States, or 
another great power, truly did regard China as its main adversary and so forced China to respond in 
kind. On the other hand, if keeping a low profile is a necessary component of Beijing's foreign policy, it 
is also insufficient. A grand strategy needs to consider other long-term objectives as well. One that 
appeals to some Chinese is the notion of building China into the most powerful state in the world: Liu 
Mingfu, a senior colonel who teaches at the People's Liberation Army's National Defense University, 
has declared that replacing the United States as the world's top military power should be China's goal. 
Another idea is to cast China as an alternative model of development (the "Beijing consensus") that can 
challenge Western systems, values, and leadership. But the Chinese leadership does not dream of 
turning China into a hegemon or a standard-bearer. Faced with mounting pressures on both the 
domestic and the international fronts, it is sober in its objectives, be they short- or long-term ones. Its 
main concern is how best to protect China's core interests-sovereignty, security, and development-
against the messy cluster of threats that the country faces today. If an organizing principle must be 
established to guide China's grand strategy, it should be the improvement of the Chinese people's living 
standards, welfare, and happiness through social justice. 
THE BIRTH OF A GREAT NATION 
Having identified China's core interests and the external pressures that threaten them, the remaining 
question is, how can China's leadership safeguard the country's interests against those threats? 
China's continued success in modernizing its economy and lifting its people's standards of living 
depends heavily on global stability. Thus, it is in China's interest to contribute to a peaceful international 
environment. China should seek peaceful solutions to residual sovereignty and security issues, 
including the thorny territorial disputes between it and its neighbors. With the current leadership in 
Taiwan refraining from seeking formal independence from the mainland, Beijing is more confident that 
peace can be maintained across the Taiwan Strait. But it has yet to reach a political agreement with 
Taipei that would prevent renewed tensions in the future. The Chinese government also needs to find 
effective means to pacify Tibet and Xinjiang, as more unrest in those regions would likely elicit reactions 
from other countries. 
Although the vast majority of people in China support a stronger Chinese military to defend the 
country's major interests, they should also recognize the dilemma that poses. As China builds its 
defense capabilities, especially its navy, it will have to convince others, including the United States and 
China's neighbors in Asia, that it is taking their concerns into consideration. It will have to make the 
plans of the People's Liberation Army more transparent and show a willingness to join efforts to 
establish security structures in the Asia-Pacific region and safeguard existing global security regimes, 
especially the nuclear non proliferation regime. It must also continue to work with other states to 
prevent Iran and North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons. China's national security will be well 
served if it makes more contributions to other countries' efforts to strengthen security in cyberspace and 
outer space. Of course, none of this excludes the possibility that China might have to use force to 
protect its sovereignty or its security in some special circumstances, such as in the event of a terrorist 
attack. 
China has been committed to almost all existing global economic regimes. But it will have to do much 
more before it is recognized as a full-fledged market economy. It has already gained an increasingly 
larger say in global economic mechanisms, such as the G20, the World Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund. Now, it needs to make specific policy proposals and adjustments to help rebalance the 
global economy and facilitate its plans to change its development pattern at home. Setting a good 
example by building a low-carbon economy is one major step that would benefit both China and the 
world. 
A grand strategy requires defining a geostrategic focus, and China's geostrategic focus is Asia. When 
communication lines in Central Asia and South Asia were poor, China's development strategy and 
economic interests tilted toward its east coast and the Pacific Ocean. Today, East Asia is still of vital 
importance, but China should and will begin to pay more strategic attention to the west. The central 
government has been conducting the Grand Western Development Program in many western 
provinces and regions, notably Tibet and Xinjiang, for more than a decade. It is now more actively 
initiating and participating in new development projects in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Central Asia, 
and throughout the Caspian Sea region, all the way to Europe. This new western outlook may reshape 
China's geostrategic vision as well as the Eurasian landscape. 
Still, relationships with great powers remain crucial to defending China's core interests. Notwithstanding 
the unprecedented economic interdependence of China, Japan, and the United States, strategic trust is 
still lacking between China and the United States and China and Japan. It is imperative that the 
Chinese-Japanese-U.S. trilateral interaction be stable and constructive, and a trilateral strategic 
dialogue is desirable. More generally, too, China will have to invest tremendous resources to promote a 
more benign image on the world stage. A China with good governance will be a likeable China. Even 
more important, it will have to learn that soft power cannot be artificially created: such influence 
originates more from a society than from a state. 
Two daunting tasks lie ahead before a better-designed Chinese grand strategy can take shape and be 
implemented. The first is to improve policy coordination among Chinese government agencies. Almost 
all institutions in the central leadership and local governments are involved in foreign relations to 
varying degrees, and it is virtually impossible for them to see China's national interest the same way or 
to speak with one voice. These differences confuse outsiders as well as the Chinese people. 
The second challenge will be to manage the diversity of views among China's political elite and the 
general public, at a time when the value system in China is changing rapidly. Mobilizing public support 
for government policies is expected to strengthen Beijing's diplomatic bargaining power while also 
helping consolidate its domestic popularity. But excessive nationalism could breed more public 
frustration and create more pressure on the government if its policies fail to deliver immediately, which 
could hurt China's political order, as well as its foreign relations. Even as it allows different voices to be 
heard on foreign affairs, the central leadership should more vigorously inform the population of its own 
view, which is consistently more moderate and prudent than the inflammatory remarks found in the 
media and on Web sites. 
No major power's interests can conform exactly to those of the international community; China is no 
exception. And with one-fifth of the world's population, it is more like a continent than a country. Yet 
despite the complexity of developing a grand strategy for China, the effort is at once consistent with 
China's internal priorities and generally positive for the international community. China will serve its 
interests better if it can provide more common goods to the international community and share more 
values with other states. 
How other countries respond to the emergence of China as a global power will also have a great impact 
on China's internal development and external behavior. If the international community appears not to 
understand China's aspirations, its anxieties, and its difficulties in feeding itself and modernizing, the 
Chinese people may ask themselves why China should be bound by rules that were essentially 
established by the Western powers. China can rightfully be expected to take on more international 
responsibilities. But then the international community should take on the responsibility of helping the 
world's largest member support itself. 
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